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Abstract 
 
Our article is a critical survey of the concepts and data utilized by economists and economic historians 
that purport to measure relative levels and long term trends in GDP per capita from the Han Dynasty 
to Communist times. We favour attempts to extend macro-economic analysis and its associated 
quantification to China’s long imperial history, but have concluded that estimates calibrated in 
international dollars for 1900, or 2005 or 2011 are not fit for that purpose. Furthermore, and after 
surveying recent endeavours to reconstruct the published secondary and official statistical sources 
available for the measurement of primary production for Ming and Qing China (1368-1911), we 
reluctantly suggest that Kuznetian paradigms for empirical economics are probably not viable, either for 
the measurement of the empire’s growth over time or for reciprocal comparisons with European 
economies. This is because on both conceptual and statistical grounds the concept and associated 
metric for GDP per capita does not travel easily and securely between the fiscal systems of China and 
the West (Yun-Casallila and O’Brien 2012). 
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1. Introduction and Preliminary Tabulations 
 
In a sequence of widely cited articles and two editions of a book (the leading 
proponent of the Kuznetsian paradigm for empirical economics) has laudably 
endeavoured to relocate the history of economic growth for the Chinese 
Empire from year one of the Common Era to our times upon a statistical basis. 
For that purpose Maddison utilized: (a) a contested series of revised official 
estimates for gross domestic products for 1956, 1960 and 1990 and one 
unofficial estimate for 1933 as a basis for backward and forward projections 
covering the years 1870-1990; and (b) several assumptions that has allowed 
him and his followers to extrapolate insecure estimates of per capita income 
(conceptualized and calibrated for contemporary purposes of international 
comparisons) from the Han dynasty to modern times (Maddison 2007 a). As 
“facts” for analysis we find the results unconvincing. As numbers they are 
instructive to confront because they reveal the limitations of research based 
upon the programme for a quantified analysis of “modern” economic growth 
inaugurated by Simon Kuznets (Kuznets 1966; Fogel 2013). That programme 
extended latterly to include China, India and other Asian economies as an 
outcome of the Divergence Debate, enjoys success for industrial, agricultural, 
regional and country studies of long term growth where and when statistical 
information for factors of production (land, labour, technologies, capital) 
inputs and outputs (for national, agricultural, industrial and service production) 
are available at macro levels. The data should (as the pioneers of historical 
national accounts recognized) be reliable within the margins of error tested 
and recognized as adequate for economic analyses of long run economic 
change (Clark 1940; Zimmerman 1965; Bairoch 1981 and 1997; Kuznets 1971). 
 
We will argue that on both factual and conceptual grounds these preconditions 
do not apply arguably even for the twentieth century and certainly not to any 
long run economic history for China (Deng 1999). The Maddison agenda to 
construct a statistical framework for a macro-economic analysis of the 
economic development of that huge empire and republic is (as a previous 
generation of Sinologists anticipated) doomed to frustration (Eckstein 1968; 
Feuerwerker 1992). This has led to the “manufacture” of proxies for data that 
is simply not there and which represents nothing other than abstract and 
subjective impressions derived from the imposition of numbers on histories 
(written on a basis of traditional evidence for which Jacques Derrida’s famous 
quote (“il n’y a plus hors du texte”) seems apposite, Putnam 1988). 
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Our view is that Maddison’s widely cited estimates or revision to them 
purporting to cover nearly two millennia of history have and cannot provide 
conceptually sound or statistically secure figures to facilitate either the 
measurement or the comprehension of long term trends for rates of growth or 
statistically based representations of comparative levels of incomes per capita 
afforded to their citizens by the Chinese and other Eurasian economies, as they 
evolved between the Han dynasty and the end of China’s imperial regime in 
1911. In simplified form the basic Maddison data are tabulated below: 
 
Table 1: Measured Maddison’s Estimates for Long Run Trends and Relative 
Levels of GDP per capita for the Chinese Empire for Bench Mark Years from 
Year 1 to 1990, Measured in International Dollars and Recalibrated into 
Kilocalories of Nutrients per Capita 
A B C D E F G 
Bench 
Mark 
Year 
circa 
GDP per 
capita in 
1990 
International 
Dollars 
Index for 
GDP per 
capita in 
1990 
International 
Dollars 
GDP per 
capita 
estimates 
transformed 
into Kilo-
calories of 
Edible Rice 
at Constant 
1990 prices 
Per Capita 
Consumption 
of Edible Rice 
(Year = 2100 
Kilocalories 
per day) 
Index 
measuring 
changes 
above Food 
Security Levels 
(4 /5) 
Variance between 
Maddison’s 
preferred Estimate 
for population and 
the highest and 
lowest of 
international 
Estimates in Print, 
in 10 million 
persons, 
Maddison’s figures 
in [] 
1 450 100 3374 2100 160 5 and 7 [5.9] 
1000 466 104 3495 2175 166 6.6 and 10 
[5.9] 
1300 600 133 4492 2800 214 6 and 8.6 [10] 
1500 600 133 4492 2800 214 5.1 and 11 
[10.3] 
1600 600 133 4492 2800 214 5.6 and 16 
[16] 
1700 600 133 4492 2800 214 5.6 and 16 
[13.8] 
1820 600 133 4492 2800 214 36.1 and 38.3 
[38.1] 
1850 600 133 4492 2800 214 43.5 and 45 
[41.2] 
1860 530 118 3444 2473 163 ? [37.7] 
1890 540 120 3506 2520 167 37.8 and 37.8 
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[38] 
1900 545 121 3537 2543 168 36.8 and 47.5 
[40] 
1913 552 123 3587 2576 171 [43.7] 
1933 579 129 4338 2715 206 [50] 
1956 616 137 4617 2888 220 [54.7] 
1960 662 170 4961 3577 236 [66.7] 
1990 1871 415 14022 8738 667 [113.5] 
Notes to the Table 
Column A displays a series of benchmark years selected by Maddison. 
Column B is a run of estimates for GDP per capita copied from Maddison 2007, 
pp. 24, 31, 37, 151 and 157. Maddison’s exposition of how he derived an 
estimate of China’s GDP for 1990 and a coefficient to convert that estimate into 
international dollars for 1990 is elaborated in Maddison (1995) appendix, pp. 
162-76 and Maddison (2007) pp. 24 and 154. Maddison relied upon the work of 
Ren (1997) pp 38-40 and Ren and Chen (1995) p. 14. His conversion coefficient is 
1 international dollar equals 1.1538 yuan at 1990 prices and weights. 
Column C is an index based on conversions of estimates in 1990 yuan into 
international dollars but is recalibrated to represent trends from year 1 to 1990. 
Column D is Column B divided by the official price per kilogramme of edible rice 
for 1990 (0.0648 yuan per kilogram) and converted into kilocalories using 
methods and coefficients prescribed by FAO (2002) as elaborated in NIIR Project 
Consultancy Services, 2012. 
Column E selects the modern FAO level for “food security” (2100 kilocalories per 
day) as an alternative conjecture for average levels of nutritional-based welfare 
afflicting the population of China under the Han Dynasty for Year 1 and 
extrapolates that level forward to 1990 utilizing rates of growth as postulated by 
Maddison in Column C. 
Column F quantifies changes in levels above food security enjoyed by the 
Chinese population implied by Maddison’s estimates for trends in per capita 
incomes in 1990 international dollars. 
Column G displays the variance found in a range of published estimates for the 
population of China (Durand 1960; Perkins 1969; McEvedy and Jones 1978; 
Liang 1980; Chao 1986; Jiang 1998; Maddison 1998; Ge 2000-1; Deng 2004; 
Zhao and Chen 2006). 
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2. Conceptual and Empirical Incongruities 
Column G of the Table includes our calculations of the variance between a 
range of alternative revisions to official estimates for total population by 
Maddison and historical demographers of China currently in print. That table 
also displays a sequence of benchmark estimates based upon rates of growth 
that Maddison postulated for forward extrapolations from a baseline figure for 
Year 1 (Column B). For the years from 1870 to 1990 he based his estimates on 
backward extrapolations from estimates for GDP in 1990 and 1933. 
All sixteen benchmarked estimates are from year 1 to 1990 and are expressed 
in a common numeraire of 1990 international dollars. Prima facie that 
numeraire conveys an undiscussed impression that the cited levels for GDP per 
capita have been derived from a sequence of benchmarked estimates 
expressed in current prices and currencies for sixteen pre-selected years that 
have been converted to international dollars at a constant rate of exchange 
designed and calibrated to represent the purchasing power parity of the 
Chinese yuan against a large sample of other national currencies for the year 
1990. 
Thus our initial and primary objection to these and other sequences of 
numbers is that even if more or less plausible estimates for GDP per capita in 
current prices ever become available for the 16 years benchmarked in the 
table the meaning and sense of converting them into international dollars at a 
constant purchasing power parity rate of exchange designed and calibrated to 
estimate a transitive and transnational value for the yuan in 1990 dollars is 
conceptually misplaced. 
In order to expose the ambiguities embodied in that rate of exchange and its 
enticing numeraire we have recalibrated Maddison’s estimates into their grain 
and kilocalorie equivalents, utilizing an equally implausible numeraire, based 
upon the average prices of two staple nutrients : rice and wheat for the year 
1990. Our calibrations utilize Maddison’s trends, but they support very 
different impressions for a possible chronology for the Great Divergence 
between China and the West. Maddison’s interpretation of that historical 
conjuncture is based on comparisons of his estimates for GDP per capita 
between China and Europe. He maintains that data suggests average standards 
of living between China and the West diverged around 1600 and the gap 
widened continuously down to very recent decades when the Chinese 
economy began to deliver increasing standards of living for its population at 
levels that continue to converge rapidly towards those afforded by western 
economies. But recalibrated into kilocalorie equivalents at constant 1990 
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prices for Chinese rice and European wheat the series generates alternative 
runs of estimates for China’s economic performance over the long run. 
Columns D, E and F of the table support an entirely different and optimistic 
interpretation of the Great Divergence. Although that on average Chinese 
standards of living could be represented as static after 1300, they also 
remained discernibly above European standards for some six to seven 
centuries down to the mid-19th century. 
This more favourable interpretation of Chinese economic history based upon 
an alternative numeraire (namely rice at constant 1990 prices) is not only at 
odds with inferences of long term retardation drawn by Maddison (and others) 
but could paradoxically be read as an inflated version of the historical 
revisionism published recently by all members of the California school and the 
late Gunder Frank. Our crude test simply reveals that the concepts and 
statistics utilized by Maddison and others who continue to construct estimates 
of China’s GDP per capita expressed in a common and modern numeraire 
conveys to facilitate the construction of both trends over time and 
comparisons with Europe need to be critically evaluated 
That examination will start with the figures in Columns B and C which were 
constructed by way of a backward extrapolation for 1990-1870 and forward 
extrapolation for the period from Years 1 to 1870. Prima facie the two series 
have been linked together by an ostensibly comparable numeraire derived 
from rates of exchange designed and calibrated to represent the international 
purchasing power parity of the yuan for the year 1990 (Maddison 1995a, pp 
162-78 and 2007b, p. 154). 
For the first period 1990-1870 Maddison applied a single conversion 
purchasing power parity rate of exchange for 1990 to official and revised 
estimates in yuan at current prices for China’s GDP for the years 1990, 1960 
and 1956 and to an estimate for 1933 , again expressed in yuan at current 
prices, published by two Chinese economists Liu and Yeh in 1965 (Liu and Yeh 
1965). With estimates for 1990 and 1933 in international dollars in place, 
Maddison then deployed a series of sectoral growth rates in constant prices 
published by three economists with expertise on China (Perkins, Rawski and 
Wang) to produce an annual average rate of growth for GDP per capita from 
1913-33 (Maddison 1995, pp. 145 and 195). He then asserted that this rate 
could be applied to the “years of recovery” from internal disorder and warfare 
1870-1912 (Maddison and Wu 2008). 
Furthermore, and because estimates originally compiled in yuan at current 
prices had been converted into dollars at international prices for 1990, 
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Maddison claimed that these numbers could also be compared with all other 
economies whose currencies could, theoretically, be converted directly or 
indirectly into the same numeraire (Fukao et al. 2007). As historians 
endeavouring to locate a chronology for economic divergence between China 
and Europe, the period 1870 to 1990 is not our primary concern. We simply 
note that the benchmark figures cited for more than a century of time are the 
product of contestable backward extrapolations, depend upon revisions to 
official estimates for GDP for 1990, 1960, 1956; rely on an estimate 
constructed as best they could by two economists for 1933 and assume that 
the averaged annual growth rate for 42 years before 1912 was the same as the 
rate constructed by three economists for 1913-33 (Maddison 2007b, pp. 156, 
157; Maddison 1995, pp. 194, 195; Maddison and Wu 2009, pp. 13-44). 
Although Maddison was undoubtedly aware that when numbers representing 
base or end years are compounded, they cumulate (over long periods of time) 
into large magnitudes, he rarely included sensitivity tests. He anticipated that 
the publication of “negotiable numbers” would stimulate other academics to 
revise them into plausible explicanda for econometric testing, historical 
analyses and statistical mapping for the history of China and other parts of the 
world economy. His work continues to be recognized as a stimulus for 
programmes of research designed to construct national accounts for historical 
periods when states did not fund institutions to measure gross national 
products (Henderson 2010; Bolt and Van Zanden 2013). 
Maddison was also aware of the properties of index numbers and how 
sensitive calibrations of purchasing power parity rates of exchange are to the 
range and quality of the data required to convert Chinese yuan and other 
national currencies into a common numeraire for purposes of conducting 
comparisons across countries and over strictly delimited spans of years for 
recent times (Prados 2000).  
Unfortunately he is no longer with us to respond to a recently published 
bibliography of literature from economists debating, criticizing and revising the 
methods, statistics and inferences that have been drawn from successive 
rounds of data collection and calibration conducted by international 
organizations in order to construct purchasing power parity rates of exchange 
for an increasingly large sample of national currencies that refer to data for 
2005 and 2011 (Deaton and Heston 2010).  
Publications by the World Bank have recently exposed high degrees of 
variations in estimates for gross domestic products, denominated in 
international dollars and based upon national prices and quantities for 2005 
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and 2011 compared to similar exercises designed to construct purchasing 
power parity rates of exchange for earlier years calibrated to include 1990 
(Heston 2010; Feenstra 2013). The differences are far too large to be accepted 
as the outcome of China’s economic growth and structural change (World Bank 
2008 and 2013). 
For economic history prolonged and unresolved debates among economists 
concerned with the compatibility of published estimates for China’s GDP per 
capita denominated in international dollars for the years 1990, 2005 and 2011 
raises questions that could, by extension, be levelled at any sequence of 
numbers purporting to refer to estimates for GDP per capita denominated in 
international dollars for any one of these years and for the short period 1990-
2013. Clearly the extension of an international data base to include the prices 
and quantities for far larger and more carefully specified samples of the 
commodities and services produced by national economies has improved the 
accuracy of the statistics and helped to refine the calibrations required to 
construct purchasing power parity rates of exchange for an extended and 
diverse range of national economies (Deaton and Heston 2010). That alone has 
rendered the selection of 1990 international dollars redundant as the 
numeraire for transnational comparisons of China’s and other accounts of GDP 
per capita over centuries of time (Bolt and Van Zanden 2013). 
Furthermore “the degree” to which the revised methodology applied to the 
extended and improved data base of prices and volumes of “matched” 
commodities and services produced by most of the world’s national economies 
for 2005 and 2011 has generated more accurate and realistic purchasing 
power parity rates of exchange for the yuan and other currencies is neither 
transparent nor settled (De Jong and Van Ark 2013; Feenstra 2013). Above all, 
the meaning and provenance of any historical sequence of estimates for GDP 
per capita denominated in international dollars that refer to recent years has 
been dismissed as conceptually misplaced (Johnson et al. 2013). 
Although purchasing power parities are not difficult to comprehend because 
they embody the potentially quantifiable notion of precisely what a particular 
amount of goods and services valued in one national currency would cost to 
purchase in the currency of another country (Sarno and Taylor 2002; World 
Bank 2008). Clearly an accurate answer depends upon the specification and 
exact measurement of the quantities of goods and services under 
consideration and their averaged prices at particular places and times. For 
example, if a typical family resident in Shanghai spent 50,000 yuan on goods 
and services in 2005 and an identical basket of goods and services would have 
cost them US$5000 in New York, the command over goods and services 
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exercised by a modal Shanghai family for, say 2005, can be expressed as a 
purchasing power parity equivalent to ten yuan equals one US$. Binary parities 
are calculable for micro units (families) living, working and consuming in 
geographically confined spaces and comparable cultures such as Shanghai and 
New York. When it comes to the calculation of parities that aim to refer to the 
entire range of goods and services produced by the economies and consumed 
by modal families resident in China and the United States, the volume and 
complexity of the calibrations required to construct purchasing power parity 
rates of exchange for macro-economic comparisons of private consumption, 
investment, governmental services and other additive components of GDP 
multiples exponentially (Rogoff 1996; Deaton and Heston 2010; World Bank 
2013). 
By 1970 the construction of parities had moved on from binary comparisons of 
purchasing power parities to embrace the more abstract concept of an 
international (Geary-Khamis) dollar designed and redesigned to construct a 
transitive conversion coefficient to transform any one national currency into all 
other national currencies (Asian Development Bank 2007). Simply put for 
purposes of cross country comparisons, that parity would ideally embody a 
nationally weighted set of prices expressed in a transnational numeraire 
(conventionally the US dollar) that refers to a particular benchmark year and 
would somehow cover a representative sample of the range of diverse goods 
and services produced and/or consumed by each and every economy that had 
opted to participate in these periodic exercises designed to measure the global 
value of a national currency expressed in international dollars. Conceptually 
this implies that an average world price in international dollars for any 
specified commodity or service (or aggregations of commodities and services 
produced by the Chinese, German or any other national economy operating 
within a modern “composite” world economy) would be the sum of the 
calculated weighted average national prices expressed in American dollars for 
a large and ostensibly representative sample of commodities and services 
produced by that particular economy divided by the number of countries 
included in samples that have increased over the years to become almost 
universal in their reach and scope (Rao 2013; Deaton and Heston 2010). 
Demands upon the statistical services of governments and international 
organizations calibrating national data into purchasing power parities to 
collect, match-up and deliver proxies for missing and low quality official 
statistics are enormous. China did not participate in any of these exercises 
before 1993. Meanwhile the extraordinary variance in prices across the 
Peoples Republic and between its cities and rural areas has persisted (Ward 
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2004). Thus the data available for average prices of commodities and services 
produced within modern China as well as the contested estimates for that 
huge and complex economy’s national accounts support a stance of scepticism 
towards all statistics that depend on estimates and rates of exchange 
constructed by international organizations and utilized to convert revised 
official estimates, surveys of household expenditures and averaged 
“nationwide” prices into international dollars for years before, during and even 
after 1990 (De Jong and Van Ark 2012, pp. 1-20; Rao 2013). 
Estimates expressed in 1990 international dollars have now, moreover, been 
confronted with the reformed methods and a larger (146 countries for 2005 
and 199 for 2011) and a more reliable data base for the construction of 
purchasing power parities for cross country comparisons of GDP per capita in 
international dollars (World Bank 2013; De Jong and Van Ark 2012). Along with 
economists, historians will note that the magnitudes of the revisions 
contemplated for major economies are highly significant. For examples for 
China and India the estimates for both absolute and relative levels of their 
gross domestic products per capita expressed in international dollars declined 
abruptly by more than 40% when converted on the revised parities published 
for 2005 and they “bounced” back up again when converted to 2011 
international dollars (Feenstra et al. 2013). 
The statistical reasons behind major revisions over such a short span of time 
(1990-2011) are well understood. The quality of Chinese, Indian and other 
national statistics has improved. Not only has the urban and dollar 
denominated bias in averaged prices been recognized but prices have been 
more carefully aligned with the qualities of the goods, but especially with 
services produced and purchased in China, India and other developing 
economies (Heston 2010; World Bank 2013). Conversely, for several developed 
economies, especially Germany and the United States, growth measured in 
both domestic and international prices seems to have been understated 
(Brümmerhoff and Grömling 2012). 
Historians fastidious about facts who have grappled with discussions among 
economists and statisticians remain concerned about the complexities of 
measuring levels and rates of growth in international dollars, particularly for 
China. The recent exposure of high degrees of variance connected to the 
methods, data and samples utilized to convert Chinese and other estimates for 
GDP into international dollars will leave them with a suspicion that figures for a 
plausible year of reference have yet to be constructed. 
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Meanwhile, and more seriously, they will recall two theoretically valid 
conditions that are necessary to transform any historical series of estimates for 
GDP measured in yuan at current prices into international dollars or some 
alternative and acceptable numeraire. First, a database containing a sufficient 
range and quality of the statistical evidence required to calibrate purchasing 
power parity rates of exchange for China, along with a representative sample 
of other national currencies calibrated into a numeraire that refers to a 
selected year for historical reference (Deaton and Heston 2010; Rao 2013). 
Over the past and future time the transnational purchasing power of the yuan 
would rise, fall and fluctuate with changes in the volumes, composition and 
prices of the commodities and services produced by the Chinese and all other 
national economies. For China, the observed movements in the transnational 
value of the yuan could, in theory, be converted into an index and used to 
deflate any available or constructible estimates for GDP for years in the past 
selected for purposes of simultaneously comparing changes over time and with 
levels for other countries. 
Apart from the entirely familiar problems involved in designing index numbers 
to capture changes in volumes, qualities and prices of goods and services 
produced and/or consumed by modal Chinese families over long spans of time, 
the tasks of assembling statistical evidence and constructing an acceptable 
database for the construction of purchasing power parity and rates of 
exchange for anything but a tiny number of national economics for the years 
preceding 1900 remain extremely problematical for historians in touch with 
the sources to contemplate (Prados 1990). 
Indeed, estimates for Chinese GDP and purchasing power parity rates of 
exchange for the yuan cannot (for reasons elaborated below) be constructed 
from the extremely meagre range of reliable historical statistics available 
either for Imperial China or probably from the more extensive data available 
for twentieth-century China. 
To circumvent the almost insuperable difficulties involved in the construction 
of a series of benchmark estimates for the GDP of imperial China converted in 
to numeraire that could theoretically allow for an estimation of trends in the 
empire’s rate of growth and comparisons with other economies. Maddison 
(and those who continue to revise and follow his procedures), have however 
resorted to methods for the calibration of the extremely poor and virtually 
unusable official data available for Imperial China and the improved, but 
imperfect and contested statistics for Republican China, in order to generate a 
sequence of estimates for GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars. 
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Prima facie these numbers lack any semblance of the credence required to 
serve either for cross country comparisons or as indices to measure rates of 
growth over such long spans of historical time.  
No acceptable estimates for Chinese GDP exist or could conceivably be 
constructed from imperial data for production, incomes and expenditure for 
years before 1911. Even if such estimates could be constructed (within levels 
of sensitivity normally associated with “plausible conjectures”) their 
conversion into a universally valid numeraire reflecting the transnational 
purchasing power parity of the yuan for a long sequence of years in the past 
would ideally require exercises for the collection and calibration of data 
comparable in scale and scope to those conducted by lavishly funded 
international organizations for modern times. Furthermore, three most recent 
programmes rigorously designed and carefully conducted to produce 
comparable and reliable estimates for GDP per capita in international dollars 
for 1985, 2005 and 2011 have generated results that are explicable but have 
not been accepted by economists either as valid representations of relative 
levels of modal standards of living across national economies or as a metric 
that measures their rates of growth for a span of time covering just twenty-
one years (Feenstra et al. 2013; Johnson et al. 2012).  
Two economists (Angus Deaton and Alan Heston) who have been closely 
engaged with the design of a conceptual framework for the collection and 
calibration of statistics required to construct purchasing power parity rates of 
exchange for these exercises remain agnostic about the inferences that have 
and continue to be drawn from utilizing even the most recent and revised rates 
for conversions into international dollars. They have concluded that “one 
general rule is that comparisons become less reliable the further apart one of 
the structures of GDP (or its components) or the countries being compared”. 
They have also recognized that “this is essentially the same as the unreliability 
of long run historical comparisons, the further back we go”. And they observed 
that “many of these numbers have substantial uncertainty and that 
extrapolations over long periods can easily lead to results that make no sense” 
(Deaton and Heston 2010, pp. 41-34; Heston 2010). 
For economic historians it continues to be the case that the meaning and 
provenance of chronological and comparative tabulations for GDP per capita 
published as explicanda for a statistically based economic history of China have 
not been clarified. 
Maddison’s methods are commendably transparent, but our perceptions are 
that they could indeed lead to results that make no sense, even if they are 
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revised to update and refine the process and procedures utilized to convert 
estimates of improved reliability for Chinese GDP per capital into international 
dollars. For example, what meaning could be inferred from Maddison’s 
estimate for Chinese GDP per capita of 552 1990 international dollars which 
was derived from the backward extrapolation 1990 to 1913 using estimated 
rates of growth based presumably on Paasche or Laspeyres’ index numbers 
designed to measure annual percentage changes in levels of Chinese prices. 
The procedure conflates and confuses two methods of deflation: one 
calibrates growth over time using a weighted average movement in the level of 
Chinese prices, and the other assumes that the transnational purchasing power 
parity of the yuan expressed in international dollars remains constant between 
1990 and 1913 and by extension all the way back to year 1 of the common era 
(Johnson et al. 2013, pp. 255-74). 
For the analysis of long run growth we concluded that a numeraire for Chinese 
GDP per capita based upon modern conversion coefficients expressed in 
international dollars, has the same implausibility as a numeraire expressed in 
kilocalories of husked rice at a constant and averaged price for rice sold in 
China over the year 1990. 
 
3. Poverty Lines, Base Years and Extrapolators for the Measurement of 
China’s Economic Growth from the Western Han to the Qing Dynasties 
Equally problematical for the measurement of very long run growth and the 
location of a chronology for the Great Divergence is the reference year 
estimate that Maddison selected to represent the per capita income for an 
average Chinese living under the Western Han Dynasty around Year 1. 
Maddison postulated that this typical individual disposed of an annual amount 
of purchasing power that was equivalent to that commanded by her/his 
modern day counterpart, living on an income definable as poverty – namely 
450 international dollars in 1990 prices. This guess was derived from ongoing 
attempts by economists employed by the World Bank to construct a metric for 
a notional and universal poverty line or subsistence level for samples of third 
world populations (Ravallion et al. 1998, 2004 and 2008; Jerven 2012). 
Famously the Bank’s figure for 1985 was set at US$1 per day and revised 
upwards to US$1.25 a day or US$456 for 1990. That concept and its conjoined 
metric have come under sustained and convincing theoretical and empirical 
attacks (Ravallion 2009; Deaton 2010; Stiglitz 2010; Allen 2013). 
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Maddison did not clarify or justify his selection of 450 international dollars for 
base year 1. Yet the figure does not convert to anything comparable to the 
annual amounts in yuan designated by the modern Chinese state to represent 
poverty lines for its rural or urban poor (Ravallion 2009 and 2010; Allen 2013). 
Furthermore, as the calibrations in Columns D, E and F in our table suggest a 
per capita income of US$450 international dollars converted to kilocalories at 
the averaged price for Chinese rice for 1990 would have allowed the typical 
Han Chinese families to have allocated an improbable 62% of their income to 
nutrients necessary for food security. Prima facie that ratio looks implausibly 
low (Deaton 2010; Stiglitz 2010). 
Sustained controversy has and continues to attend programmes designed to 
formulate a universal standard for the measurement of global poverty and/or 
subsistence for our own times (Alam 2006 and 2013). Maddison did not 
confront the conceptual and statistical complexities involved in constructing 
and pricing a basket of goods consumed by the very poor across the world in 
1990 international dollars for our own times. He simply assumed that the 
populations of the Chinese empire, before the era of the Song Dynasty, lived at 
a standard of living that could be proxied by a highly controversial modern 
metric of 450 international dollars (Stiglitz 2010; Allen 2013). 
With a base line estimate conveniently denominated in 1990 dollars in place, 
variations and cycles in the growth of population and output are ignored by 
Maddison’s data for GDP per capita which suggests (vide table 1) that almost 
no change occurred for over a millennium before the advent of the Sung 
Dynasty. According to some contested statistics for population totals, the 
production of iron, urbanization rates as well as the consensual views of 
historians of medieval China under that Dynasty, the imperial economy 
experienced an “efflorescence” that carried per capita incomes up to a 
significantly higher level (Deng 2013 and 2015). Maddison’s figures suggest 
that this uplift amounted to an order of magnitude of approximately 33% over 
some three centuries of time. So much for an eminent Sinologist’s considered 
view that “One of the most dramatic cycles of economic development and 
decline in all Asian history occurred in North China between the eighth and 
thirteenth centuries” (Skinner 1985, p. 166). Thereafter, Maddison posited that 
the Chinese economy “suffered setbacks under the Yuan” (Mongol Dynasty) 
from which (so his numbers suggest) it recovered and thereafter experienced 
some 350 years of stasis followed by a century of fluctuations in incomes per 
capita around a level that remained discernibly below a static level sustained 
from circa 1300 to circa 1850. In his view that level diverged sharply from 
levels attained by the economies of Western Europe, North America and 
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Australasia (vide Maddison 2007b, p. 43; 1998 and 2001, p. 264 for 
comparisons with Europe). 
These speculations for rates of growth are drawn from a restricted range of 
reading from secondary sources in Chinese history published in English and 
transposed into numerical abstractions deserve to be quoted in his own words: 
“I assume growth per capita income under the Song was substantial ([i.e.] “it 
grew by about a third”) but [was] “slower in pace than Europe achieved in the 
proto-capitalist period 1400-1820”. I assume that per capita income peaked in 
the Song … [when] “there is good reason to believe Europe had fallen 
substantially below Chinese levels! [A] “temporary setback” [occurred] under 
the Yuan but over the long run in the Ming-Ch’ing dynasties per capita 
performance was roughly stable”. This bold summary, covering centuries of 
Chinese economic history, could hardly become consensual among experts for 
a field that is distinguished by the most impressive historiographical tradition 
for research and debate for any Asian country.  
On the contrary, a bibliography of monographs in Chinese history is easily 
marshalled to suggest the Ming-Qing period witnessed a steady performance 
in agricultural and industrial growth despite the onset of a ‘Little Ice Age’ 
(Zhang 1996; Man 2009). Supplies of arable land remained elastic until the late 
Qing (Deng 2011, pp. 19-20; Deng 2016, p. 18). Double-cropping of rice was 
introduced to the south of the Yangzi River on a noticeable scale for the first 
time in China’s history (Chao 1986, p. 199; Cheng 1992, pp. 98-101; Liang 2006, 
p. 117). A real push for the new cropping practices came directly from the 
Kangxi Emperor in the form of a well-publicised five-year experiment (1715-20) 
conducted on a model rice farm of 100 mu in south Jiangsu. The experiment 
achieved an average increase of 47% in output per unit of land cropped (Zhang 
1996, p. 412). This became the yield plateau that prevailed for the rest of the 
Qing period (Shi 2012, p. 56). According to Liu, yield levels in the Lower Yangzi 
Region increased by a factor of 2-2.5 by 1850 from their Song levels. In some 
places, they had risen by a factor of 5 (Liu 2013, pp. 104, 106). Farming tools 
had also improved (Yin and Hui 2012). Chinese economic historians agree that 
commercialized domestic cotton textile production took off during the Ming 
Period (Xu 1989; Fan 2008; Wu 2009). 
Maddison recognized that complementary historical statistics could also serve 
to represent the economic performance of the Chinese Empire under the Ming 
and Qing dynasties (1368-1911) were needed to carry conviction. He found 
support for his speculations in the quantified conclusions based upon the 
historical research and analysis conducted by two distinguished American 
sinologists and social scientists: Dwight Perkins of Harvard and Gilbert Rozman 
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of Princeton. Rozman concluded that there had been little change in the 
proportion of the population living in towns from the Tang to Qing dynasties 
(Maddison 1995 and his 2007b, pp. 10, 24, 31, 37, 151; Rozman 1973). Perkins 
had written a classic book exposing trends in long term per capita grain 
production (Perkins 1969). We deemed it necessary to review the nature and 
quality of the data that American scholars had produced, used by Maddison to 
underpin his tabulations for GDP per capita which correctly serve to provide a 
factual foundation for more recent and on-going attempts to construct 
estimates for Chinese GDP ab initio from primary sources. 
Perkins’ endeavours to produce economic indices to represent trends in per 
capita production of grain output for the Chinese Empire in “Ming-Qing” times 
are scholarly, widely cited and commendable. Since the state made no attempt 
to collect imperial statistics either for agricultural production, for the cultivated 
area or for yields per mu for land cropped, Perkins constructed estimates 
based upon: (a) official records including: censuses of taxed population, 
cultivated areas subjected to taxation, scattered references to grain yields per 
mu cultivated for particular localities, and (b) ad hoc data culled from revisions 
and reconstructions by Chinese scholars of agrarian history including backward 
extrapolations from Buck’s surveys of villages for the 1920s and 1930s, official 
statistics for 1957 and for years thereafter. His book contains a range of 
estimates that offered admirably qualified conjectures for the absence of valid 
official statistics for the agrarian sector of the economy – statistics that Alex 
Eckstein (another distinguished economist and sinologist) did not consider it 
possible to construct (Eckstein 1968, pp. 34-5). 
Perkins’ primary contested series of estimates consisted of population totals 
culled from several secondary sources to which he attached possible margins 
of error. Problems with imperial China’s demographic data are familiar and for 
present purposes the figures used can be commended for attaching potential 
degrees of variation to estimates that he utilized. 
We suggest there is no need to review or revise the diverse range of figures 
currently in print for China’s population because they are (as we will show) the 
only acceptable series of statistics Perkins had access to in order to measure 
historical trends in grain output and by inference food consumption per capita 
for the Chinese empire. 
With imperfect but discussable estimates for population in place, Perkins’ 
second task was to establish a sequence of multipliers in order to calculate 
estimates for volumes of grain output per capita. Grains included rice, wheat, 
millet and potatoes that he measured in catties of unhusked rice equivalents 
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converted to a metric standard at a rate of 2 catties equals 1 kilogramme 
(Perkins 1969, p. 309). Perkins then settled not for a sequence of multipliers 
but for a constant 527 catties per capita by positing that:  
(a) Per capita grain output fluctuated if at all only within narrow limits – an 
assertion that was not checked against records for changes in grain 
prices 
(b) Variations were bounded by a subsistence level of 400 catties and an 
upper limit of 700 catties per capita (Perkins 1969, pp. 14-15 and 297) 
(c) In Ming-Qing times (1368-1911) “less than 500 seems more likely than 
600” 
(d) The “130 villages or so surveyed by John Lossing Buck in the late 1930s 
the estimates for fewer than 10 villages fall below 400 carries” (Perkins, 
pp. 15-16). 
 
In his Chart F1 Perkins also cited five historical sources from Sung times to 
1844 to claim “it does seem clear that 3 shi (600 catties) of husked rice 
represented typical annual grain consumption.” 600 catties is equivalent to 
300 kilograms for edible rice but on p. 301 he confusingly states “both the Buck 
and provincial data indicate that per capita grain availability seldom fell below 
180-240 kilograms (unhusked) during the twentieth century” (Perkins 1969, 
Appendix F). 
 
Agrarian history for China is frustratingly resistant to quantification, not least 
because the figures recorded for rice production and consumption are 
expressed in volumes (shi) and weights catties). They are often not 
distinguished between husked and unhusked rice. One shi of husked rice 
weighs 200 catties. In unhusked, inedible and coarse form a shi weighs 130 
catties (Li 1998, p. xvii). Perkins’ consistently used a fixed multiplier of 572 
catties (286 kilograms) of unhusked rice which he reduces by 50% to 286 
catties (143 kilograms) of husked rice (Perkins 1969, p. 309). Modern food 
science utilized by the FAO and United States Department of Agriculture obtain 
their coefficients for the conversion of unhusked to husked and edible rice by 
positing a lower wastage rate (32% instead of 50%) and transform a 
kilogramme of husked rice into nutrients with an energy value of 3,660 
kilocalories a day (F.A.O. 2002; U.S.D.A. 2010). 
 
If Perkins is to be corrected by modern science his 572 catties of unhusked rice 
translates into 
 
0.68 (286 kg) (3,660 kilocalories) 
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365 
which transforms into 1,950 kilocalories per capita per day, which comes close 
to Buck’s estimate of 1,823 kilocalories for the 1930’s (Buck 1937). 
The multiplier selected by Perkins for purposes of providing an index of 
historical trends in grain output per capita is above the level of 200 kilograms 
of unhusked rice that Perkins (and Buck) defined for “subsistence” but is 
clearly below the level of 2,100 kilocalories a day prescribed today by the FAO 
as necessary for “food security” (F.A.O. 2002). 
Interpreted in terms of standards recommended by modern nutritional science 
Perkins’ estimates for per capita grain consumption imply that a majority (and 
possibly a substantial majority) of the population of the Chinese Empire lived in 
conditions at the edge of “food security” for more than half a millennium after 
1400. For masses of Chinese, standards of living could only have fallen below 
that precarious level in times of disorder and crisis (the years of takeover by 
Manchu armies and the Taiping rebellion). If Perkins’ speculations are plausible 
they also subsisted at that level for most years during Ming-Qing times. Thus, 
Maddison’s numerical depiction and interpretation of long run stasis is 
supported by Perkins. 
But the big question remains: how acceptable is the cited data from Perkins by 
Maddison and those who repeat and reuse his rates of growth in per capita 
income in 1990 dollars. They are derived from contested statistics for 
population growth and a selected non-validated constant of 572 catties of 
unhusked rice. Could Perkins’ estimates represent trends that correlate with 
trends in GDP per capita? Perkins thought they could. He attempted to 
corroborate his conjectures with reference to evidence derived from an official 
survey of agricultural output for 1957 and more historically with statistics 
derived from an elaborate alternative calculation based upon reconstructed 
estimates for the area of arable land cultivated with grains multiplied by 
another “guess” for weighted average yields (again measured in catties of 
unhusked rice equivalents per mu). We suggest that for reasons that he almost 
recognizes, these alternative and potentially corroborative estimates are 
equally unconvincing (Perkins 1969, p. 298). 
Two runs of statistics are required for such an exercise. First, estimates for the 
area of arable land available for cultivation with one or more crops of grain for 
a series of “representative/modal” years. Secondly, (and accepting Perkins’ 
“assumption” that 80% of the cultivated arable land of the Chinese Empire 
produced grain year after year) viable estimates for average annual yields per 
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mu cropped once, twice or even three times with rice and other grains (Perkins 
1969, p. 17). 
Despite their importance for government finance, cadastral surveys for 
Imperial china were rarely undertaken and subject to wide margins of error. 
The first attempt to carry out an empire-wide cadastral survey was made 
under the Northern Song dynasty when private land ownership became the 
dominant form of landholding. In 1072 AD, Emperor Shenzong (r. 1068-85) 
issued a decree to survey all farmland in Song territory utilizing the fangbu as 
the standard survey unit for cultivated land (Zhang 1986, vol. 10, p. 7981; Wu 
1985, pp. 17-18). Each fangbu consisted of 6 paces2. 5 chi was counted as 1 
pace; hence 1 fangbu was 30 chi2. Only five provinces were properly surveyed 
under this scheme (Tuotuo 1986, vol. 7, p. 5716). A second systematic survey 
began in 1387. Six years later a total of 850,762,300 mu (1 mu = 240 x 6 paces2 
and often translated into 0.38 hectares) had been officially registered (Zhang 
1986, vol. 10, p. 7981; Liang 2004). In 1578 the Ming government carried out 
another limited cadastral survey. Cadastral Registration was resumed under 
the Qing Dynasty in 1654 and that cadastral record was used as the basis for 
taxation until 1690 (Zhao 1986, vol. 11, p. 9260). Ad hoc amendments occurred 
but after 1690 no empire-wide cadastral surveys were ever carried out (Zhao 
and Chen 2006, ch. 2). According to official regulations for 1765, “villagers 
measure their own lands, officials conduct random checks” (Zhao 1927, 
‘Shihou 2’, in Twenty-Five Official Histories 1986 vol. 11, p. 9259). Zhao 
estimated under-reporting in cadastral surveys amounted to 20-30 per cent 
(Zhao 2007). 
Furthermore and as a unit of cultivated land the mu was never standardized 
across imperial china. Its area and fecundity varied significantly from province 
to province, locality to locality and from time to time. In general the average 
output from one mu (i.e. 240 x 6 paces2) of medium fertility in a region became 
fixed as a fiscal benchmark. That benchmark was then used as the common 
denominator to convert outputs (“bags” of grain) from plots of different areas 
and fertilities to a number of taxable units in order to simplify assessments for 
taxation. This deliberate and persistent government procedure for “mu 
conversion” was known as zhemu. For example, in 1109 Emperor Shenzong 
decreed that 1 mu of the highest quality was equal to 10 mu of the lowest 
quality (Xu 1976, vol. 7, p. 6416). A government registered mu became nothing 
more than a virtual unit for fiscal purposes century after century and 
continued as such during the Ming and Qing dynasties (Liang 1980, p. 528) and 
Zhao 2007). In 2012 Shi Zhihong observed “Gross mu (damu) were larger than 
the official size of 240 x 6 paces2. Across China the mu varied from 260 x 6 
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paces2, 430 x 6 paces2, 480 x 6 paces2, 540 x 6 paces2, 600 x 6 paces2, 720 x 6 
paces2, 960 x 6 paces2, to 1200 x 6 paces2 . Thus, figures for mu recorded in 
official historical records cannot be converted into a standard/imperial mu 
unless we can clarify the type of ‘mu’ referred to by a particular record.” (Shi 
2012, p. 55) 
Surveys conducted under Ming and Qing governments do not provide 
historians with records of the empire’s area of cultivated land expressed in a 
standardized unit for area. Official statistics for cultivable land are distorted by 
textual errors, the inclusion of untaxed land and significant degrees of variance 
in the area denominated in mu. Above all they are distorted by grading land for 
fiscal purposes to reflect differences in the underlying fertility of the soil. To 
convert Ming surveys of fiscal mu to estimates that approximate to the area 
cultivated with grains requires arduous and complex manipulations of data 
that ceased to be collected after 1690. Perkins (with help from a prior exercise 
published by Fujita) produced a series of “most likely” estimates of 370 million 
mu plus or minus 70 million shimu (“modern mu” for circa 1400 and 500 
million shimu plus or minus 100 million mu for circa 1600 and 666 million 
(presumably plus or minus 20%) for 1661 and 950 shimu for the 1770s (Perkins 
1969, Appendix B, pp. 221-35). 
Perkins also made the not implausible assumption that the cultivated area 
(shimu) grew between 1685 and 1700, 1725, 1766, 1777, 1812 and 1851 in line 
with the area measured as non-standardized fiscal mu for these surveyed years 
(Perkins 1969, pp. 231-4). For 1873 and years thereafter he utilized estimates 
of the area cultivated and compiled by the Department of Agricultural 
Economics of Nanjing University and the officially measured area for 1957 
(Perkins 1969, pp. 232-6).  
With very rough estimates for areas of cultivated and not cropped land 
expressed in a reconstructed and partially standardized mu in place, Perkins 
then considered a database of 900 observations he collected for yields “per 
mu” for disparate years and for scattered locations across the empire. For circa 
1500 to circa 1800 he noted their high degree of variance and observed the 
lack of uniformity in Chinese weights and measures and the resort to figures 
for rents (normally levied as a share of the first rice crop) as a substitute for 
crop yields (Perkins 1969, Appendix 1; Li 1998; Huang 1988). 
For reasons that are not elaborated, his book tabulates a drastically reduced 
sample of estimates for unhusked rice yields (catties per shimu) for just four 
locations that he referred to centuries of time: 1500-99, 1600-99 and 1700-99. 
Even for that reduced sample the variations for just twelve observations 
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ranged from 250 to 520 catties per annum (Perkins 1969, p. 315, Table G.2). He 
almost admits that this data could not be used for purposes of constructing an 
alternative conjecture for total grain output in unhusked rice that might 
otherwise support his basic estimates. Nevertheless, on close examination that 
conjecture turns out to be based upon contested statistics for the empire’s 
population, multiplied by a discussed but hardly verifiable constant for 
purposes of estimating production per capita (Deng 2004; Lavely and Wong 
1998). 
To sum up, Perkins’ serious attempts to come to grips with inadequate and 
unreliable data for grain production/consumption has been translated into 
upper and lower bound estimates that remain wide apart. They have been 
used to support his and Maddison’s perceptions of stasis over the Ming-Qing 
era. Perkins preferred estimates are based on nothing more than population 
totals and a conjectured constant of 286 kilograms of unhusked rice per capita 
which transforms into a contestable level of 1,995 kilocalories per person per 
day (vide table 1). His altogether more tentative manipulations of insecure 
data for cultivated land and its gross average yields per semi-standardized mu 
expressed in catties of unhusked rice generate numbers that translate into 
lower and upper bound numbers of 2,635 and 5,124 kilocalories a day. They do 
not corroborate his estimates for kilocalories based upon the size of the 
empire’s population multiplied by a constant (Perkins 1969, Appendix G). 
Perhaps the most balances judgment to make about an exercise conducted by 
a distinguished economist to relocate the agrarian history of Imperial China on 
a statistical basis for purposes of measuring rates and levels of agricultural 
growth is that it remains as a heuristic example of an endeavour to produce 
data for the Kuznetian paradigm for the “empirical tradition economics” (Fogel 
2013). Sadly it does not supply economic historians with the macro-economic 
data required to forge a statistical explicandum for a modern economic history 
of the Ming-Qing Empire. Perkins’ data (referred to as “mostly likely 
conjectures”) are, we have concluded, based upon official sources that are 
simply not fit for that purpose (vide Perkins 1969, pp. 8-17). 
Maddison depended on Perkins to select the otherwise unverifiable rates of 
growth he utilized to extrapolate his own numerical constructions for China’s 
GDP in international dollars backwards and forwards through centuries of 
Chinese imperial history. He also cited Rozman’s 1973 figures for the empire’s 
urbanization ratio (Rozman 1973). Some archaeologists cling resolutely to that 
ratio as the only statistical evidence available to them for meta-narratives of 
economic development for prehistoric and classical centuries (Morris 2010 and 
21 
 
2013). Nevertheless, correlations between that index and changes in real levels 
of GDP per capita are not uncritically recognized by economic historians of 
Europe or China as transparent enough to be transposed into cycles or even 
medium term trends for the development of pre-modern economies. They 
remain aware of cycles in the location of proto industry (Braudel 1988). The 
data gathered by Chandler and Fox 1987 and Bairoch 1988 is not, moreover, 
canonical (vide Bloom and Khanna 2007; Pascarti and Dunn 2002; Taylor 2013). 
Agreed, the economic mechanisms through which the agglomeration of populations 
within the boundaries of geographical units (designated as “urban” by states 
for administrative purposes, and by historians in terms of population and 
households that vary in scale from 1,000 to 50,000 people) could, theoretically, 
operate to promote nationwide economic growth are well understood (Fujita 
et al. 2000; Krugman and Venables 1995; Ge 2000-1). Relevant correlations 
have, moreover, been tested for recent times (Fujita et al. 2000; Taylor 2013; 
Polere 2009; De Long and Shleifer 1993). 
Nevertheless, it has not been established precisely how other features and 
factors such as differentials between rural and urban wages or variations in the 
administrative boundaries established by political authorities for purposes of 
governance, taxation and defence) operated across space and time. 
Meanwhile Rozman’s set of urbanization ratios for the Chinese empire 
continue to retain their status as an insecure indicator for the measurement of 
trends or levels of economic development (Ge 2000-1; Duan 1999). Imperial 
China’s relatively low and stable ratios may simply reflect a greater degree of 
dispersal of more productive activities associated with manufacturing and 
professional services across a vast empire. They have also been plausibly 
related to: the overall area of an expanding polity, internal peace and security, 
the size of the empire’s population and to the densities of its transportation of 
communications networks (Cao 2001; McKeown 2011, pp. 309-19; Rosenthal 
and Wong 2011). 
4. Conclusions on Prospects for the Construction and Reconstruction of 
Estimates for Imperial China’s Gross Domestic Products 
Our ostensibly negative conclusions will be formulated in the wake of the 
Divergence Debate to recall that the Kuznetian paradigm for modern economic 
history depends upon access to data that is statistically and conceptually 
secure enough to provide quantified explicanda as a basis for competing 
analytical narratives addressing the course, patterns and causes of long term 
trends in GDP per capita.  
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Our sense is that no secure basis exists for backward extrapolation based upon 
modern concept and contemporary statistics. For post-Imperial China official 
estimates for gross domestic product and its sectoral components are few in 
number confined to very recent years and remain contestable (Feenstra et at. 
2013). Furthermore, the variance in prices for comparable commodities and 
services produced within China’s vast and geographically heterogeneous 
territory continues to frustrate the efforts of the Chinese state to provide 
international organizations with averaged prices for specified samples of goods 
and services required to convert domestic outputs denominated in yuan into 
international dollars even for very recent years (Heston 2010; World Bank 
2013). Furthermore, if and when more acceptable estimates in international 
dollars for a contemporary base year becomes available their extrapolation 
over decades and centuries of time at  constant transitive and transnational 
rates of exchanges is a flawed procedure because it will lead (as recent 
exercises for a 23 year period have revealed) to implausible variations over an 
entirely short span of years (Feenstra et al. 2013; World Bank 2013; Deaton 
and Heston 2010). 
Prospects for the construction of any long run historical chronology within 
which narratives of the Great Divergence might be located and analysed are, 
we contend, entirely remote. No such sources for Imperial China have 
emerged or have been embodied in modern secondary literature that might 
conceivably allow historians to construct reliable estimates or even plausible 
conjectures for historical trends or levels of the empire’s primary production. 
Our close examination of a pioneering and classical attempt by Perkins has 
exposed the transparent but unveritable assumptions that a distinguished 
Harvard economist made in order to publish estimates for the long term 
growth in the output of food grains alone. 
To proceed towards the construction of a feasible run of statistics for grain 
output per capita, Perkins plumped for estimates with variances of 20% each 
way for the total population. He derived that denominator from a range of 
secondary sources based on the numbers of male taxpayers registered by the 
state and a competing range of multipliers for average family sizes. He 
assumed that 80% of the cultivated area was cropped with food grains (rice, 
wheat, barley, millet, maize and potatoes) and calibrated a ratio between the 
area of arable land recorded more or less accurately as land subjected to tax 
by the state and the wider area of land recorded for just three years and a lot 
less comprehensively or accurately depicted as cultivated land in cadastral 
surveys conducted by the Ming state in 1578 and by the Qing state in 1654 and 
1690. 
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Somehow Perkins also transformed a regionally restricted and locally diverse 
range of “fiscal land” cropped with grains denominated in a non-comparable 
unit for measurement of cultivated areas into a standardized and modern 
shimu. Historically the mu had varied by a factor of 4.62 across China, which 
probably accounts for large variations in the range of estimates for the 
cultivated area, published in modern secondary literature. With very rough 
estimates for the empire’s population and with guesses for an arable area 
cultivated with grains in place, Perkins then constructed two multipliers to 
guestimate trends in the total value of grain produced over time. For grain 
output per head of population he selected a constant of 286 kilograms of 
unhusked rice equivalents. For grain output per modern shimu cultivated 
Perkins also considered a database of 900 observations for yields which he 
reduced to just twelve (presumably modal) quotations ranging from 250 to 520 
catties of unhusked rice per shimu referred to three demarcated centuries of 
time from 1500 to 1800. These estimates did not, however, corroborate 
conjectures for outputs of grains per capita. 
It is not difficult to expose deficiencies in the guestimates for total grain output 
made by Perkins. Nevertheless, his selection of a constant for grain output per 
capita has in effect predetermined a conception of early modern Chinese 
economic history as one of stasis. Needless to say that interpretation has been 
disputed, not only by the California School but by an extensive bibliography of 
scholarship from Chinese historians – whose expertise resides in their 
knowledge of the diverse and particular ecological conditions, cropping 
patterns and institutions of China’s geographically heterogeneous sector for 
primary production (Li 1998). 
Primary production is, moreover, the dominant component of all pre-modern 
gross domestic products. The virtual absence of official statistics covering the 
empire for the production and prices of: grains, other food, crops, outputs 
from livestock, and fish, organic raw materials (including timber, cotton fibres, 
ramie, silk, opium, vegetable oils, etc) seems to be nothing less than an 
insuperable obstacle for the construction of comprehensive national accounts 
for pre-modern China. 
Two reasons are behind this unwelcomed conclusion. First, since the Han 
Dynasty (206 BCE-220AD) a practice has prevailed of writing up official 
histories of a succession of Chinese dynasties by state appointed scholars. 
After the completion of that task the dynasty’s archives were destroyed. The 
Qing (1644-1911) is an exception because there is no official history for the last 
24 
 
imperial dynasty. Nevertheless, surviving archives and records for the Qing are 
sparse and defective. 
No empire-wide economic surveys or investigations were ever conducted by 
specialized state institutions mandated to gather statistics. Information 
despatched to Beijing on agriculture and food prices depended upon casual 
and often outsourced observations from local officials and was rarely checked. 
Generations of historians of China would agree with “Skinner’s suspicion” that 
data for the Qing and all other dynasties are anecdotal, compromised by urban 
bias and are not independently verifiable (Skinner 1987). Among historians and 
social scientists confronting this restricted volume narrow range and poor 
quality statistical evidence for the economic history of the empire, the 
response has been to “manufacture” guestimates for macro-economic 
magnitudes that purport to refer to China as a whole. 
Furthermore, and once these guestimates are in print and cited, they become 
canonical and acquire the status of primary sources. As numbers they tend to 
be recycled and fine-tuned. Their origins and accuracy are too rarely 
investigated or questioned. Almost all currently published data for China’s GDP 
can be traced back to a handful of secondary sources including: Wu Hui’s 
books that includes guestimates (1) for farm output and grain yields (Wu 1985; 
Wu 2009), (2) for industrial and service outputs for the 18th and 20th centuries 
(Xu and Wu 1985), and (3) for services of the Chinese gentry at the end of the 
19th century (Chang 1955). For the Republican era, two studies for national 
income have also matured into canonical sources for purposes of the backward 
extrapolation of growth to include the late Qing economy (Ou 1947; Liu and 
Yen 1965), and many have followed the suit (e.g. Xu and Wu 1985). 
More recently a trio of European economic historians with help from Chinese 
collaborators have attempted to apply the Kuznetian paradigm as exemplified 
by Maddison’s attempts to manufacture a series of estimates for GDP per 
capita to the economic history of the Chinese empire. They continue to fine-
tune, revise and refine the same body of primary statistical sources 
manipulated by Perkins and subsequent generations of Chinese economic 
historians. 
They anticipate that their heroic endeavours might allow economists and 
historians to refer to an imperial economy as it developed over the Ming-Qing 
along with other eras of China’s very long run history of economic 
development and to settle debate on the Great Divergence (Liu 2012; 
Broadberry 2013; Broadberry et al. 2014, 2015). 
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It is our contention that they have unfortunately, but predictably, run into the 
buffers of access to a body of imperial statistics that are extensive in coverage 
and secure enough for the estimation of levels and for trends in primary 
production. Given that an overwhelming share of imperial output remained 
primary and land based, for present purposes we propose to bypass all other 
estimates now in print for industry and services. 
Meanwhile (and as we read them) surveys in English of recently published 
books and articles in Chinese designed to construct viable historical estimates 
for Imperial China’s GDP per capita and its sectoral components have neither 
recovered new and more reliable official sources for primary production nor 
revised, refined and supplemented the limited and unreliable statistical 
evidence available to Perkins nearly fifty years ago (Broadberry et al. 2014 and 
2015; Shi et al. 2014; Ma and de Jong 2014). 
To forensically examine the array of estimates even for primary production 
culled from secondary sources published in Chinese in order to provide the 
statistics required for viable exercises in national accounting would make for a 
lengthy and tedious elaboration of a basic point long familiar to generations of 
historians who have conducted research into statistical records of the Ming- 
Qing state that are written in classical Chinese.  
Instead we invite colleagues who have assiduously scoured the secondary 
literature in search of “numerical evidence” to respond to their depressing 
judgments that have been made over the years to the ad hoc “numbers” that 
they are prepared to manipulate and calibrate into plausible estimates in order 
to construct national accounts for China going back to the Northern Song 
dynasty (Broadberry et al. 2014; Ma and de Jong 2014). We urge them to 
empirically examine the insurmountable deficiencies in the restricted range of 
official statistical evidence available for the Chinese empire. 
For example, the Ming-Qing regimes (1368-1911) never conducted a 
population census, but simply aggregated “figures” submitted by provincial 
officials on the numbers of male taxpayers. The range of estimates for total 
population currently in print are derived from multipliers for family size that 
display rather high and unsettled degrees of variation from author to author 
(see Table 1). Most scholars of China’s historical demography remain cautious 
and unwilling to commit to any sequence of estimates for the empire’s total 
population (Pomeranz 2000; Lee and Wang 1999).  
Between 1368-1911 the Ming-Qing states conducted just three geographically 
confined and inefficiently executed cadastral surveys of their empires 
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cultivated area. For that variable (crucial for quantification) the archival 
evidence consists basically of arable land subjected to taxes assessed and 
collected by local officials on behalf of the state. Fiscal and agrarian historians 
of China have, however, published an impressive range of local evidence to 
suggest that the figures recorded as taxed arable land often fell way short of 
the land actually allocated to the production of food crops (including tea, sugar 
and fruit) to organic raw materials or to mulberry trees and timber, as well as 
land used as pasture for rearing varieties of farm animals. 
Perkins utilized a ratio derived from figures for the share of taxed to cultivated 
land as recorded in so-called cadastral surveys conducted by Ming and Qing 
officials. There is, however, no evidential basis for assuming that even his or 
other “constructed” ratios had, or could conceivably have remained constant 
over centuries of time while the empire’s territory was expanded. The route 
for calibration from taxed to cultivated arable land has been over simplified by 
methods that resort to constant but unverified ratios between two seriously 
imperfect sets of statistics. Furthermore, the “failure” of the dynastic state to  
prescribe and enforce a standardized unit for the measurement of the area of 
land under cultivation or taxed has left historians with the well-nigh impossible 
task of interpreting meanings attachable to records that refer to areas of land 
cultivated, cropped or liable for taxation, expressed in mu. 
Areas denominated in mu varied significantly across the provinces and 
prefectures of China, from place to place and time to time. Moreover and for 
fiscal purposes the state denominated “arable” potentially liable for taxation in 
relation to its underlying fecundity. Perkins and other scholars in grappling 
with the problem of converting a heterogeneous range of official and other 
numbers recognized these difficulties, but “ploughed on” with the well-nigh 
impossible task of converting mu as recorded in the Ming-Qing documents into 
a modern standardized shimu. 
Their frustrations with the extant imperial records available for the estimation 
of arable, pastoral and forest land allocated to primary production continue, 
moreover, to be compounded by the almost total absence of statistics 
exposing plausible conjectures for the shares of cultivated mu allocated to a 
variety of food crops (including tea and sugar) to organic raw materials, to 
trees and to pasture for animal products. 
An array of ad hoc references to yields per mu have been collated into imperial 
databases, but the observed variance across space and through time has left 
agrarian historians of China and all but a minority of resolute economists with 
the sense that a series of weighted imperial average yields for the food crops 
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and raw materials produced by the farmers operating during Ming-Qing times 
has not and probably cannot be constructed (Shi 2012). Furthermore, it is 
imperative to recognize that many if not most of the references to yields per 
mu cited by Bozhong Li and other agrarian historians have been extracted from 
manuals and agrarian treatises, published by literati and designed to instruct 
peasant farmers on best practice techniques for the cultivation of crops .It is 
not fortuitous that the surveys and estimates conducted by John Buck in the 
1920s and 1930s of farms and farming at village levels continue to command 
respect as the canonical point of reference and comparison for hard evidence 
about all aspects of Chinese agriculture (Buck 1964). Buck recorded actual 
yields for the 1920s that are considerably lower than those anticipated as 
possible or ideal in manuals published in Qing-Ming and earlier times (Deng 
1993). 
Finally, and what has not invariably been taken into account for the estimation 
of the net value added for this dominant component of China’s GDP is multiple 
cropping. The same area of cultivated mu (if and where that unit could be 
properly measured) often yielded two or more crops per annum. Yet 
references to yields often refer to the cultivated and not to the cropped area. 
Furthermore, and as the extent of multiple cropping increased over time, 
demands for unpaid labour to maintain the infrastructural capital of canals, 
dykes and ditches required to carry water on to and off arable land along with 
expenditures upon purchased inputs such as organic fertilizers, seeds, tools 
and animal power increased in order to maintain and raise yields. Differentials 
between gross and net farm outputs surely widened. That gap varied by place, 
crop and over time and to degrees that cannot feasibly be encapsulated by 
another resort to simple or constant averages between supposedly known and 
unknown outputs and to any constant relationship over centuries of time 
between inputs and outputs. 
It is appropriate to draw this old fashioned exercise in data validation to a 
conclusion by reaffirming our support for the Kuznetian paradigm for empirical 
economics including the deployment of macro-economic theory allied to the 
construction of social accounts. We ardently advocate quantifying the 
quantifiable in order to provide explicanda for the analysis of long term, 
economic growth. We have no wish to fuel the now currently fashionable 
rejection of GDP per capita as a misleading macro-economic indicator and 
starting point for the construction of analytical narratives for (a) the long run 
growth of national economies, (b) for reciprocal comparisons designed to 
provide quantified impressions of how effectively polities and economies 
sustained the welfare of their populations, and (c) above all to establish a 
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chronology for current debates on the Great Divergence (Mishan 1977; Jerven 
2012; Philipsen 2015). Nevertheless, we are as sceptical as Simon Kuznets 
might well have been of heroic attempts to extend his paradigm for modern 
economic history to include China, India and other Asian empires. 
The geopolitical history and political economy of the Mughal, Ottoman and 
above all the Ming-Qing regimes reveals that they lacked the political and 
administrative capacities required for sustained centralized and direct rule 
over vast territories and heterogeneous populations. Prudentially their rulers 
settled for strictly limited degrees of fiscal penetration and lacked the power 
and administrative capacities to obtain the flows of information required to 
create and sustain fiscal states. Basically this is why the primary sources 
available for the macro-economic reconstruction of estimates of GDP per 
capita is far more limited for the Orient than for the Occident. 
The unavoidable resort to distant secondary sources and to the manipulation 
of ad hoc and ambiguous figures for key statistics for population, for cultivated 
and cropped areas, for the composition coverage and prices for agricultural 
outputs; for yields of land based farm outputs has not generated acceptable 
estimates for either primary and, we suspect, most other forms of production. 
Although attempts to construct such estimates contain scholarly and heuristic 
contributions to the economic history of China, they are not fit for the purpose 
of serving as an explicadum for trends and cycles in the empire’s long term 
developments. Concepts such as GDP per capita do not travel either through 
time or across the polities and economies of Eurasia (Howlett and Morgan 
2010). 
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